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Recognizing the Derivative 
Works Right as a Moral Right: 
A Case Comparison and Proposal 
Deidré A. Keller † 
“All writers since immemorial time have been borrowers.” * 
“Th[e] utilitarian view of copyrights . . . , embraced by Jefferson 
and Madison, stands in contrast to the ‘natural rights’ view 
underlying much of continental European copyright law . . . .” ** 
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Introduction 
All authors build upon the work of those who came before them. 
Perhaps the most revered copyright scholar of the twentieth century, 
Melville Nimmer, noted as much in opining that the musical and 
movie West Side Story was, at some level of abstraction, a retelling of 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet.1 Were Romeo and Juliet protected 
by the Copyright Act of 1976, the heirs of Shakespeare might well 
have a case for infringement of the derivative works right.  
Copyright owners marshal the derivative works right to exert 
control over use of their works.2 In such cases, courts tend to find in 
favor of the owners and, thereby, deprive the public of new works.3 
This Article will engage in a close reading of the cases concerning 
Gone with the Wind 4 and The Catcher in the Rye 5 in order to better 
understand the degree of control asserted by copyright owners and 
enforced by courts.  
 
1. 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 13.03 (rev. ed. 2012). 
2. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 37, Warner Bros. Entm’t v. RDR Books, 575 F. 
Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 1:07-cv-09667-RPP) (“While Ms. 
Rowling has permitted some fan sites certain latitude to make use of the 
material in her books, these sites are generally free to the public and 
exist to enable fans to communicate, rather than to create an 
unauthorized derivative work in order to turn a quick and easy profit 
based on her own creativity. Ms. Rowling never gave anyone permission 
to publish and offer for sale a 400-page Harry Potter ‘lexicon’.”). 
3. E.g., Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (finding for the plaintiff at the 
conclusion of a bench trial and awarding a permanent injunction and 
statutory damages). 
4. Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the Wind (1936). 
5. J.D. Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye (1951). 
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The term “derivative work” is defined broadly in the Copyright 
Act as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
translation, . . . dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, 
. . . abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may 
be recast, transformed, or adapted.”6 Section 106(2) reserves to the 
copyright owner the exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based 
upon the copyrighted work.”7 As such, the derivative works right is 
the only right in the copyright bundle represented by 17 U.S.C. § 106 
that overtly limits the creation of new works.8 The other rights 
articulated in § 106 limit reproduction,9 distribution,10 performance,11 
display,12 and digital audio transmission13 of the original work.14 This 
renders the derivative works right the most problematic of the rights 
in the bundle because by limiting the creation and dissemination of 
new works it arguably implicates the First Amendment and runs 
counter to the purpose of copyright articulated in the Constitution, 
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”15 This is so 
whether one understands that purpose as providing incentives for 
creation or dissemination of new works.16  
 
6. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
7. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
8. Many commentators have noted that given the fact that the standard 
for infringement—substantial similarity—is the same in the context of 
infringement of the reproduction right and the derivative works right, 
the derivative works right may be seen as superfluous. See 2 Melville 
B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.09[A] (rev. 
ed. 2012) (“The best indication of the superfluity of the adaptation right lies 
in the fact that those infrequent cases under the 1909 Act that invoked the 
comparable right to ‘make any other version,’ generally also invoked an 
alternative ground of infringing copying.” (footnote omitted)).  
9. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
10. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
11. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). 
12. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). 
13. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). 
14. Some commentators have noted that courts tend to conflate infringe-
ment of the derivative works right with infringement of the reproduction 
right. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s 
Constitutionality, 112 Yale L.J. 1, 50–52 (2002) (discussing cases in 
which a claim of infringement of the derivative works right was asserted 
and considered).  
15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and 
the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 831, 894–99 (2010).  
16. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (“Evidence from the 
founding, moreover, suggests that inducing dissemination—as opposed 
to creation—was viewed as an appropriate means to promote science.”); 
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This Article will demonstrate that copyright owners alleging 
infringement of the derivative works right and courts enforcing that 
right are often seeking to vindicate something other than an economic 
right—a moral right.17 Moral rights, in this context, refers to the 
nonpecuniary interests recognized by many countries to be held by 
authors of creative works, specifically, the rights of attribution, disclo-
sure, integrity, and withdrawal.18 These rights are seen as protecting 
an author’s personality interests in his creation.19 As such, it is 
difficult to see how such rights are related to the utilitarian mandate 
embodied in the Constitution.20 Therefore, moral rights ought to be 
 
see also id. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[C]opyright’s grants of 
limited monopoly privileges to authors . . . [are] private benefits . . . 
conferred for a public reason—to elicit new creation.”). The major 
theoretical disagreement between Justice Ginsburg writing for the 
majority and Justice Breyer’s dissent turns upon the issue of whether 
the “Progress of Science” language in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of 
the Constitution requires Congress to legislate to promote creation or 
dissemination. See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles 
Project: Directions for Reform, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1175, 1181 
(2010) (asserting that copyright is intended to incentivize both creation 
and dissemination).  
17. The issue of whether authors ought to be imbued with any exclusive 
rights with respect to derivative works has been previously considered. 
See, e.g., John M. Olin, Note, “Recoding” and the Derivative Works 
Entitlement: Addressing the First Amendment Challenge, 119 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1488, 1497–1501 (2006) (discussing the consequences of a public 
right to recode). 
18. See generally Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study 
in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554 
(1940) (discussing the development of the moral rights doctrine). 
19. See Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law 
Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 
1, 4 (1988) (“The crucial link between the American right of personality 
and the concept of moral rights is that works of art are expressions of 
the creative personality of the author, and insofar as these works 
continue to embody the author’s personality, acts done to them that 
impair their ability accurately to reflect the author’s personality should 
be actionable.”); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and 
Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 81, 
81 (1998) (“Property rights, it was observed, are a means to protect the 
personality interest or ‘personhood’ of individuals; this seemed especially 
true with intellectual property rights that are draped over creations of 
the human mind. Along these lines, personhood proponents could 
understandably be found in the vanguard of ‘moral rights’ for 
authors . . . .”).  
20. Roberta Rosenthall Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging 
a Moral Rights Law for the United States 24 (2010) (“[T]he 
scant history of the Copyright Clause fails to reflect an explicit concern 
with recognizing the personal rights of authors as an independent end. 
On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the Framers’ primary 
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distinguished from the pecuniary rights at the heart of copyright. 
There is an argument, of course, that such rights are not worthy of 
protection in the first instance.21 But since courts enforce such rights 
in the guise of enforcing the derivative works right, this Article will 
presume that such rights are worthy of protection while arguing that 
in the absence of Constitutional justification and given the personal 
nature of moral rights, they should receive more limited protection.22 
To accomplish these goals, § 106(2) of the Copyright Act of 1976 
should be repealed and replaced with a more limited grant of rights 
subject to a compulsory license.23 This new § 106(2) will protect a 
copyright owner’s economic interest in derivative works. In addition, 
to the extent that the moral rights of literary authors are found to be 
worthy of protection, a new § 106B should be adopted. The moral 
right protected by the proposed § 106B should not apply to works 
made for hire, should be inalienable, and should be limited in duration 
to the lifetime of the author. 
While neither Eldred v. Ashcroft 24 nor Golan v. Holder 25 centered 
on the derivative works right, both had implications for secondary uses 
of copyrighted works. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held 
 
policies were influenced heavily by the utilitarian goals of promoting 
progress, safeguarding public access, and protecting the public domain 
as the mechanism ensuring access to information and facts in expressive 
works.”). 
21. See Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 263, 279 
(2009) (arguing that the protection of moral rights may deter creation). 
22. See infra Part I; see also Thomas P. Heide, The Moral Right of 
Integrity and the Global Information Infrastructure: Time for a New 
Approach?, 2 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 211, 230 n.84 (1996) 
(discussing recourse available through state moral rights statutes). 
23. The idea of a compulsory license associated with § 106(2) has been 
suggested before. See Robert J. Morrison, Deriver’s Licenses: An 
Argument for Establishing a Statutory License for Derivative Works, 6 
Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 87 (2006) (discussing compulsory licenses 
as the best way to strike a balance between removing the permission 
right and keeping the right to receive payment for use). Moreover, the 
Copyright Act of 1976 already includes compulsory licenses in other 
contexts. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (providing for compulsory 
licenses to create new versions of existing sound recordings provided 
certain conditions are met). Determining whether the proposal would 
pass the Berne three-step test is beyond the scope of this Article. For a 
recent discussion of whether a compulsory licensing proposal passes the 
test, see Jason Iuliano, Is Legal File Sharing Legal? An Analysis of the 
Berne Three-Step Test, 16 Va. J.L. & Tech. 464 (2011).  
24. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
25. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
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that the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA)26 passed constitu-
tional muster.27 The CTEA extended the copyright term from the life 
of the author plus fifty years to the life of the author plus seventy 
years.28 This effectively postponed the availability of works for use by 
those wishing to create derivatives. In Golan v. Holder, the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act (URAA)29 which removed from the public domain works that were 
previously available for use by secondary authors.30 In both Eldred and 
Golan, the petitioners alleged that Congress exceeded the scope of 
authority granted to it in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the 
Constitution (the Copyright Clause) and that the statutes in question 
infringed upon the First Amendment.31 In both cases, the Court 
deferred to Congress’s determination that the legislation in question 
“serve[d] the objectives of the Copyright Clause.”32 In Golan, the Court 
also clarified its statement from Eldred that heightened First Amend-
ment scrutiny would be appropriate only in cases in which Congress 
altered the “traditional contours of copyright.” The Golan Court 
limited the phrase “traditional contours of copyright” to the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the affirmative defense of fair use.33 
While this clarification had been long awaited,34 this limitation signifi-
cantly curtailed the arguments available to parties seeking to assert 
First Amendment challenges to new copyright legislation.35  
 
26. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 
§ 102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827–28 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 302, 304). 
27. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222. 
28. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302). 
29. Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A). 
30. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878 (2012). For the Court’s discussion of the 
impact of the URAA on authors of derivative works, see id. at 883. 
31. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193–94; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878. 
32. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889; see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198. 
33. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890. 
34. See, e.g., William McGinty, First Amendment Rights to Protected 
Expression: What Are the Traditional Contours of Copyright Law?, 23 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1099, 1100 (2008) (“Because the judiciary has 
rendered toothless the Copyright Clause’s limits on Congressional 
power, the First Amendment is the last hope for anyone arguing that 
the Constitution places substantive limits on Congress’s ability to pass 
copyright laws.”). 
35. See generally David L. Lange, Risa J. Weaver & Shiveh Roxana Reed, 
Golan v. Holder: Copyright in the Image of the First Amendment, 11 J. 
Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 83 (2011) (advancing the idea that 
the Tenth Circuit’s decision upholding the URAA ought to be reversed 
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In Part I, this Article will compare the cases concerning Gone 
with the Wind and The Catcher in the Rye in order to focus the 
inquiry on the derivative works right itself. While some of the existing 
literature proposes deploying strengthened First Amendment arguments 
in derivative works cases,36 such arguments have proven largely 
ineffective in copyright infringement litigation.37 Other scholars argue 
that fair use, properly applied, can function as a limit on the 
derivative works right.38 Unfortunately, this strategy has also been 
unsuccessful.39 Part I of this Article will undertake a review not only 
of the opinions but also the arguments advanced by the parties in the 
Gone with the Wind and Catcher cases to consider how copyright 
owners and secondary users understand the derivative works right and 
to determine which arguments appear to resonate in the opinions at 
the district and appellate court levels. This comparison will serve to 
develop the issues inherent in infringement determinations in the 
context of allegedly infringing derivative works and to demonstrate an 
attempt, on the part of both parties and courts, to vindicate a moral 
right, namely, the right of integrity.   
on First Amendment grounds, after the Tenth Circuit’s decision but 
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision).  
36. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 14, at 48 (arguing that courts ought to 
consider the freedom of imagination inherent in the First Amendment in 
making decisions with regard to derivative works). 
37. See, e.g., Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1105 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair 
use are sufficient to protect any First Amendment interests not fully 
alleviated by the ability to quote purely factual information); Ass’n of 
Am. Med. Colleges v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 20 
(D.D.C. 2004) (“The First Amendment does not require that copyrighted 
works be published or made available to particular persons”.). 
38. See, e.g., David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. 
Rev. 139 (2009) (arguing for a more structured rule-based approach to 
fair use to preemptively clarify which uses are fair); see also Arlen W. 
Langvardt & Tara E. Langvardt, Caught in the Copyright Rye: Freeing 
First Amendment Interests from the Constraints of the Traditional 
View, 2 Harv. J. Sports & Ent. L. 99, 139 (2011) (arguing for courts 
to apply the fair use analysis in a way that is more sensitive to First 
Amendment concerns); Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 395, 399 (2009) (proposing an administrative 
agency to review copyright infringement and fair use issues); Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va. L. Rev. 
1483, 1488–89 (2007) (arguing for the introduction of bright-line rules 
articulating that certain minimal levels of copying are per se fair uses). 
39. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 
132, 146 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[W]e therefore reject defendants’ fair use 
defense.”). For a cogent argument that fair use has never operated in 
American jurisprudence as an effective limitation on the rights of 
copyright owners, see John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph 
of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 465, 492–502 (2005).  
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In Part II, the Article will engage in a brief historical account of 
the evolution of copyright protection in the United States by way of 
tracing how the various changes impacted the protection afforded 
Gone with the Wind and Catcher. In Part III, the Article will consider 
the justifications for copyright in the existing literature. Part IV will 
pose the question of how we might solve the problems associated with 
the derivative works right and outline the existing literature on the 
protection of moral rights in the United States. Finally, in Part V, 
this Article proposes revising 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) and adopting a new 
§ 106B. These revisions to the statute will serve three main purposes. 
First, they will render transparent the personhood interest often sought 
to be vindicated by copyright owners under the current § 106(2). 
Second, they will act as a restraint on the power of copyright owners to 
deny authorization for derivative works except in the limited circum-
stances where an individual author is asserting his or her moral rights. 
Finally, these revisions will bring the derivative works right more in 
line with the constitutional and historical moorings of copyright in the 
United States.  
I. A Case Comparison: Does the Derivative Works 
Right Allow Copyright Owners to Control 
Derivative Uses?  
Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind, first published in 1936 
and the recipient of a 1937 Pulitzer Prize, is set against the backdrop 
of the Civil War.40 Its climax takes place in Atlanta during the siege 
as General Sherman’s troops are approaching.41 In 2001, Gone with 
the Wind found itself at the center of a very different battle—a suit 
for copyright infringement.42 Nearly ten years later, J.D. Salinger’s 
novel about a troubled teenager’s inner turmoil, The Catcher in the 
Rye, would also find itself at the center of a copyright infringement 
suit.43  
In SunTrust v. Houghton Mifflin, Co.,44 the owners of the Gone 
with the Wind copyright alleged that Alice Randall’s first novel, The 
 
40. 1937 Winners, The Pulitzer Prizes, http://www.pulitzer.org/awards/ 
1937 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
41. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 353–55. 
42. Complaint ¶ 2, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust I ), 
136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (No. 1:01-CV-701) [hereinafter 
SunTrust Complaint].  
43. Complaint ¶ 1, Salinger v. Colting (Salinger I ), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09 Civ. 5095) [hereinafter Salinger Complaint]. 
44. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust I ), 136 F. Supp. 2d 
1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001).  
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Wind Done Gone,45 infringed upon that copyright (this case is referred 
to interchangeably throughout as “SunTrust ” or the “Gone with the 
Wind case”). In Salinger v. Colting,46 the dispute centered on whether 
Fredrik Colting’s first novel, 60 Years Later: Coming Through the 
Rye,47 infringed the copyright of Catcher in the Rye (this case is 
referred to interchangeably throughout as “Salinger ” or the “Catcher 
case”). In both cases, the copyright owners alleged infringement of the 
derivative works right and copying of characters.48 In both cases, the 
defendants answered by raising the affirmative defenses of fair use and 
the First Amendment.49 The Northern District of Georgia preliminarily 
enjoined the publication of The Wind Done Gone.50 Ten years later, 
the Southern District of New York preliminarily enjoined 60 Years 
Later.51 Both the Eleventh Circuit and the Second Circuit vacated the 
issued injunctions, but for vastly different reasons.52 The resolution of 
both cases would ultimately turn on the issue of fair use.53  
All of these similarities notwithstanding, these cases would come 
to vastly different ends. Randall’s novel would go on to publication,54 
 
45. Alice Randall, The Wind Done Gone (2001). 
46. Salinger v. Colting (Salinger I ), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
47. John David California, 60 Years Later: Coming Through the 
Rye (2009). 
48. SunTrust Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 3; Salinger Complaint, supra note 
43, ¶¶ 70, 76–83.  
49. Answer and Affirmative Defenses at 8, SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d 
1357 (No. 1:01-CV-701-CAP) [hereinafter SunTrust Answer and 
Affirmative Defenses]; Amended Answer and Counterclaim at 1213, 
Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 09 Civ. 05095 (DAB)) [hereinafter 
Salinger Amended Answer and Counterclaim]. 
50. Order at 51, SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (No. 1:01-CV-701-CAP). 
51. Memorandum and Order at 37, Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 
1:09-cv-05095 (DAB)).  
52. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust III ), 268 F.3d 
1257, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled 
to an injunction because The Wind Done Gone had a valid fair-use 
defense); see also Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II ), 607 F.3d 68, 74–75 
(2d Cir. 2010) (vacating the injunction and remanding for a 
determination of whether the plaintiff demonstrated irreparable harm as 
required by the Supreme Court’s holding in eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)). 
53. See SunTrust III, 268 F.3d at 1276 (“[B]ased upon our analysis of the 
fair use factors we find, at this juncture, [The Wind Done Gone] is 
entitled to a fair-use defense.”); Salinger II, 607 F.3d at 83 (“Defendants 
are not likely to prevail in their fair use defense.”). 
54. Press Release, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Settlement Reached Regarding 
The Wind Done Gone (May 9, 2002), available at http://www. 
houghtonmifflinbooks.com/features/randall_url/may9pr.shtml. 
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while Colting’s novel would end up the subject of a permanent 
injunction against publication or sale in the United States.55 A close 
examination of these cases teaches that very similar cases may come to 
divergent ends because the fair use doctrine, relied upon by courts and 
scholars alike to protect freedom of expression in the copyright 
context,56 is highly unpredictable.57 The purpose of this case comparison 
is to refocus the discussion away from rehabilitating the fair use 
doctrine or, alternatively, strengthening First Amendment protections, 
and to consider instead the contours of the derivative works right, how 
it is deployed by copyright owners, and how it is handled by courts. 
A. Arguments Propounded by the Plaintiffs:  
How Copyright Owners See the Derivative Works Right 
The arguments espoused by the plaintiffs in SunTrust and Salinger 
are strikingly similar. They amount to an assertion that the copyright 
owner ought to have control over all derivative uses,58 even where the 
copyright owner has refused to license uses such as the use in question, 
as was the case in SunTrust,59 and even where the copyright owner has 
stated publically that he would never license any derivative uses, as 
was the case in Salinger.60  
 
55. Permanent Injunction and Final Order on Consent at 1, Salinger I, 641 
F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 09 Civ. 05095 (DAB)).  
56. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003), the Supreme Court 
stated, “copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommoda-
tions.” In discussing those accommodations, the Court went on to say 
“the ‘fair use’ defense allows the public to use not only facts and ideas 
contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain 
circumstances.” See generally Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First 
Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970) (discussing the conflict 
between copyright law and the First Amendment).  
57. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech 
Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, 
Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 
B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2000) (pointing out the conflict between copyright law 
and the First Amendment). But see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study 
of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
549 (2008) (conducting an empirical analysis of all of the fair use 
opinions over the referenced period and finding that the decisions are 
not as unpredictable as the scholarship would suggest). 
58. Nothing in the statutory language requires such a broad reading. 
Rather, the statute reserves to the copyright owner the explicit right to 
“prepare derivative works.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006). 
59. Infra Part I.B. 
60. Infra Part I.B. 
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Both cases began with allegations of infringement of the 
derivative works right and of the copyright in characters.61 Neither 
complaint included an allegation that the copyright owner had 
registered the allegedly infringed characters.62 Rather, the plaintiffs 
relied upon the registrations for the novels in question to demonstrate 
that they owned valid and subsisting copyrights in the characters that 
populate the novels.63 In SunTrust, while the specific allegations of 
infringement of the derivative works right and characters are asserted 
in the “Facts” section of the complaint,64 SunTrust’s actual allegation 
of copyright infringement states, “Defendant . . . has willfully in-
fringed upon the Mitchell Trusts’ rights by reproducing, displaying, 
manufacturing, distributing, promoting, advertising and selling its 
infringing work ‘The Wind Done Gone’ without the permission . . . of 
the Mitchell Trusts . . . .”65 This is a blanket assertion that amounts  
61. SunTrust Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 3; Salinger Complaint, supra note 
43, ¶¶ 70, 76–83. 
62. See SunTrust Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 2. Salinger Complaint, supra 
note 43, ¶ 1. The statute requires registration prior to pursuing a civil 
infringement action: “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in 
any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or 
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with 
this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006). In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010), the Supreme Court held that 
the requirement embodied in § 411(a) was not a jurisdictional 
requirement but rather a claims processing rule. In any event, character 
registration has seemingly never been required by courts. See, e.g., 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 
1287, 1293–97 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that the James Bond character 
is copyrightable and protected as expressed in sixteen James Bond films 
despite the fact plaintiffs did not have a copyright in the character 
itself). 
63. In Salinger v. Colting (Salinger I ), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009), the plaintiff alleged only that Holden Caulfield is a copyrighted 
character, infringed by the defendant’s work. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in 
Support of Application for Preliminary Injunction at 14, Salinger I, 641 
F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 1:09-cv-05095-DAB) [hereinafter Salinger 
Preliminary Injunction Memo] (“Salinger owns a valid copyright in [the 
novel] Catcher. That copyright protects the character of Holden 
Caulfield who pervades that novel; it is, in fact his story.” (citation 
omitted)). For an illuminating discussion of the issues associated with 
copyright protection for fictional characters, see Leslie A. Kurtz, The 
Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 
429, and Gregory S. Schienke, Comment, The Spawn of Learned Hand—
A Reexamination of Copyright Protection and Fictional Characters: 
How Distinctly Delineated Must the Story Be Told?, 9 Marq. Intell. 
Prop. L. Rev. 63 (2005). See also Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One 
X Prods., 644 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2011), for a recent treatment of this 
issue by a court. 
64. SunTrust Complaint, supra note 42, ¶¶ 10–31.  
65. Id. ¶ 35. 
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to accusing the defendant of infringing all of the relevant rights 
granted to a copyright owner by 17 U.S.C. § 106. Since the 
consequences flowing from infringement of any of the § 106 rights are 
the same, this blanket assertion is, arguably, entirely appropriate.  
The arguments asserted by the plaintiffs in these cases do diverge 
in one notable manner. In SunTrust, the plaintiff asserted that 
defendant’s unauthorized derivative work interfered with the 
plaintiff’s ability to license derivative works as it had in the past.66 
Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that it had already licensed a 
derivative work, not yet completed at the time of the litigation, the 
completion of which was allegedly threatened by the defendant’s 
actions.67 To the contrary, the plaintiff in Salinger argued that the 
defendant was interfering with “his constitutionally based right not to 
publish derivatives of works he ha[d] previously authored and 
published, i.e., the privacy underpinning of the Copyright Clause.”68 
It appears the plaintiff in Salinger was asserting the right of privacy 
said to be inherent in the right of first publication.69 At the appellate 
level, this argument is more refined. The plaintiff relied primarily on 
the right to privacy in arguing that he has the right to refuse to 
 
66. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 2, SunTrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust I ), 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 
2001) (No. 1:01-CV-701) [hereinafter SunTrust Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction] (“Because ‘The Wind 
Done Gone’ is an unauthorized sequel, its publication will diminish, or 
preclude outright, the ability of the Mitchell Trusts to authorize and 
control future derivative works. Moreover, future publishers will not pay 
for rights that Houghton Mifflin has taken for free.” (emphasis added)). 
67. See SunTrust Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 15. The referenced sequel, 
Rhett Butler’s People, was published in November 2007, despite the 
publication of The Wind Done Gone six years earlier. See Stephen L. 
Carter, Almost a Gentleman, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2007, at G14 (book 
review). 
68. Salinger Preliminary Injunction Memo, supra note 63, at 29; see also id. 
at 8 (“While Salinger’s copyright in Catcher could no doubt be put to 
lucrative use if he chose to author or allow an adaptation, sequel, or any 
other derivative work, he has instead chosen—as is his right—not to 
further exploit his copyright.”). 
69. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
Harv. L. Rev. 193, 200 (1890) (“[The right to privacy] is entirely 
independent of the copyright laws . . . . The aim of those statutes is to 
secure to the author, composer, or artist the entire profits arising from 
publication; but the common-law protection enables him to control 
absolutely the act of publication, and in the exercise of his own 
discretion, to decide whether there shall be any publication at all. . . . 
[T]he common-law right [to privacy] is lost as soon as there is a 
publication.”). For a recent case considering the viability of the privacy 
interest represented by copyright, see Smith v. NBC Universal, 86 
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1579 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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create or license derivative works.70 The plaintiff further argued that 
failure on the part of the court to protect this right would abridge the 
plaintiff’s First Amendment right not to speak and, thereby, 
constitute irreparable harm.71 While these allegations in Salinger are 
markedly different, as a factual matter, from the allegation in 
SunTrust, both amount to an assertion of essentially the same right—
that is, the right of copyright owners “to control the fate of their 
works and characters.”72  
This right to control appears to embody the plaintiffs’ under-
standing of the essential feature of the right granted by 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(2). Some language utilized by the plaintiffs in these cases is 
illustrative. In SunTrust, the plaintiff argued that in the absence of 
 
70. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 47, Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II ), 
607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878-cv) [hereinafter Salinger 
Appellate Brief] (“Defendants never so much as acknowledge the 
existence of Salinger’s right not to publish or his right not to authorize 
derivatives. Both the right of first publication and the adaptation right 
stem from one of the constitutional underpinnings of copyright law, 
namely the right of privacy, i.e., the right not to publish.” (citing 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 
(1985))). It is important to note that Harper & Row had only to do 
with the right of first publication and nothing to do with the derivative 
works right.  
71. Id. at 50 (“Salinger’s constitutionally based right not to publish 
derivatives is not the type of injury that can adequately be remedied by 
monetary damages; it is exactly the kind of damage that courts 
traditionally find irreparable. Indeed, this Court has reversed a lower 
court for failing to issue a preliminary injunction in a case involving the 
right not to speak, citing the many cases to that effect.”). See generally 
David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government 
Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. Rev. 995 (1982) 
(arguing that negative First Amendment interests should be driven by 
interest in individual selfhood); Anna M. Tarushio, Note, The First 
Amendment, The Right Not To Speak And The Problem Of Government 
Access Statutes, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1001 (2000) (arguing that the 
principal of autonomy protects the right to be silent); Robert A. Sedler, 
The First Amendment Right to Silence (Nov. 9, 2007) (unpublished 
research paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031505 (arguing 
that the freedom of speech and the freedom of association together 
create a right of silence). As an interesting aside, some countries do 
recognize a moral right to refuse to disseminate one’s work. See 
generally Carl H. Settlemyer III, Note, Between Thought and 
Possession: Artists’ Moral Rights and Public Access to Creative Works, 
81 Geo. L.J. 2291 (1993) (noting that European copyright law aims to 
protect the moral rights). 
72. SunTrust Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction, supra note 66, at 3; see also id. at 16–17 (“The Mitchell 
Trusts, as copyright owner, have the exclusive right to authorize 
derivative works and to control the fate of their characters.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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interlocutory relief, “[t]he Mitchell Trust will have been deprived of 
its most basic right to create and authorize derivative works and to 
control the way its copyrighted characters are portrayed.”73 Similarly, 
in Salinger, the plaintiff asserted that “Salinger has an absolute right 
to decide when, whether, and how to resurrect the life that he 
breathed into Holden Caulfield in another work and/or at some 
different age.”74 What is interesting about the divergence of these 
arguments is that the plaintiff in SunTrust clothes its argument in the 
language of utilitarianism:  
If Defendant is permitted to publish this unauthorized derivative 
work, the result will be that anyone could tell the story of “Gone 
With the Wind” from another point of view or create sequels or 
prequels populated by the Mitchell characters without any 
compensation to the Mitchell Trusts. Nothing would have a more 
dramatic or detrimental effect on the potential market for the 
sequels and other authorized derivative works.75 
But Salinger’s insistence that he will never license a derivative of 
Catcher renders his meager attempt to resort to utilitarianism all but 
empty.76 The plaintiff in Salinger went so far as to assert that 
the harm to Salinger here is not solely (if at all) to his “pride”, 
but rather to his copyright interests, economic as well as  
“reputational”. The economic injury to the potential market for 
derivatives, discussed above, is an interest Salinger is entitled to 
protect. Amici characterize the nature of that injury as a 
“moral right”, and discount it because U.S. copyright laws do 
not take moral rights into account. It is specious to argue that 
U.S. copyright laws and particularly the equitable fair use 
 
73. Id. at 31–32 (emphasis added); Transcript of Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order Before the Honorable Charles A. Pannell United 
States District Judge at 27, SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (No. 1:01-
CV-701-CAP) [hereinafter Temporary Restraining Order Transcript] 
(“The reason that the—the copyright holder has this basic right, this 
right—the exclusive right to authorize derivative works is that that 
permits him . . . to control the fate of his characters, to be able to 
determine how these characters will be used.”). 
74. Salinger Preliminary Injunction Memo, supra note 63, at 27 (emphasis 
added). 
75. SunTrust Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction, supra note 66, at 27. 
76. See Salinger Preliminary Injunction Memo, supra note 63, at 26–27. The 
memo attempted to focus the court’s inquiry on the “potential market” 
rather than any actual plans by Salinger to use the Holden Caulfield 
character. And it cited Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 
(2d Cir. 1987), for the proposition that “Salinger has the right to change 
his mind. He is entitled to protect his opportunity to sell” his works. 
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defense are not flexible enough to encompass some consideration 
of moral rights . . . .77 
Given the current state of the law, these articulations of absolute 
control, even in the absence of reasonable utilitarian motivations, may 
well be accurate. The question here is whether copyright ought to 
grant such an expansive right of control. 
B. Arguments Propounded by the Defendants:  
How Secondary Users See the Derivative Works Right 
The defendants in both SunTrust and Salinger answered the 
plaintiffs’ assertions of control with claims of fair use and First 
Amendment protection for their secondary uses.78 Their answers 
advanced the notion that some uses of copyrighted works ought not 
to require the permission of the copyright owner. In fact, in both 
Salinger and SunTrust no such permission would be forthcoming. The 
Mitchell Trusts would never allow the publication of a work that 
included homosexuality or miscegenation.79 Randall’s work breached 
 
77. Salinger Appellate Brief, supra note 70, at 55. 
78. The defendants in SunTrust asserted, among others, the following 
affirmative defenses:  
Defendant’s right to publish The Wind Done Gone is protected 
by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. A 
restraining order or injunction impeding promotion and/or 
publication of The Wind Done Gone would be an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint. . . . In the event the Court or jury finds 
that The Wind Done Gone copies copyrightable expression from 
Gone With the Wind, any such copying is a fair use of that 
expression under 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
SunTrust Answer and Affirmative Defenses, supra note 49, at 8. 
Similarly, defendants in Salinger raised affirmative defenses:  
Salinger’s claims for copyright infringement are barred in whole 
or in part because [Coming Through the Rye] is a fair use of 
[Catcher in the Rye]. . . . Any grant of the relief requested by 
Salinger would infringe on Defendants’ rights under the First 
Amendment . . . . 
Salinger Amended Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 49, ¶¶ 99–100, 
106. Note that the defendants in SunTrust also asserted the defense of 
copyright misuse. See SunTrust Answer and Affirmative Defenses, supra 
note 49, at 8 (“Plaintiff’s actions in bringing this lawsuit constitute 
copyright misuse.”). 
79. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust III ), 268 F.3d 1257, 
1282 (11th Cir. 2001) (referencing Pat Conroy’s attestation indicating 
that in negotiations with the copyright owner over the licensing of a 
sequel authored by Conroy, the Estate insisted that there be no mention 
of homosexuality or miscegenation). 
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both of these conditions.80 Similarly, Salinger had stated that the 
story of Holden Caulfield began and ended with Catcher, and he 
remained committed to that notion.81 Furthermore, he refused to 
license or create any derivative of any of his copyrighted works.82  
The defendants’ claims of fair use and reliance upon the First 
Amendment, if successful, would have meant that the uses these 
defendants made of the copyrighted works in question were beyond 
the control of the copyright owner. The issuance of injunctive relief 
would, of course, bear out the opposite meaning.  
The tension here, between the plaintiffs’ assertion of control and 
the defendants’ counterassertion that their uses ought not to be 
controlled by copyright owners, is obvious. The question is which of 
these assertions wins the day. It is argued by many,83 and was decided 
by the district courts in both Salinger and SunTrust, that this 
question ought to be decided by reference to the freedom of expression 
safeguards alleged to be inherent to copyright, namely, the 
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine.84 Examinations of 
the opinions in these cases will demonstrate that the idea/expression 
dichotomy is hardly engaged in any meaningful way.85 Rather, the 
 
80. Id. (“In light of [the Estate’s stance against homosexuality and 
miscegenation], the The Wind Done Gone’s transformation of Ashley 
Wilkes into a homosexual, its depiction of interracial sex, and its 
multiple mulatto characters take on additional relevance.”). 
81. In 1980, Salinger stated that “[t]here’s no more to Holden Caulfield. 
Read the book again. It’s all there. Holden Caulfield is only a frozen 
moment in time.” Salinger Appellate Brief, supra note 70, at 6. 
82. Id. (“Salinger has always declined [to permit adaptations of his 
works].”). 
83. See, e.g., Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Copyright Under Siege: The First 
Amendment Front, 9 Computer L. Rev. & Tech. J. 41 (2004) 
(arguing that the emergence of new digital technologies should not open 
up to criticism traditional judicial interpretations of the interplay 
between copyright and freedom of speech). 
84. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust I ), 136 F. Supp. 
2d 1357, 1385 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“With respect to copyright protection, 
however, the First Amendment does not license an infringing author to 
trample on legally recognized rights.” (citations omitted)); Salinger v. 
Colting (Salinger I ), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“At the 
Constitutional level, while the Copyright Clause and the First 
Amendment are intuitively in conflict, they were drafted to work 
together to prevent censorship such that the balance between the First 
Amendment and copyright is preserved, in part, by the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
85. See Defendant Houghton-Mifflin Co.’s Response in Opposition to 
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction at 6, SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (No. 1:01-CV-701-
CAP) (“An ‘axiom of copyright law’ is that it protects the original way 
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decisions are focused steadfastly on the fair use doctrine. This focus is 
maintained in spite of the fact that the defendants in both SunTrust 
and Salinger alleged that the issuance of an injunction would 
constitute an unlawful prior restraint in clear violation of the First 
Amendment.86 Both district court decisions disregarded the asserted 
First Amendment defense, evidencing a determination that either the 
defendants’ use constituted fair use or constituted infringement.  
C. The Decisions of the District Courts: Trial Courts Construe  
the Derivative Works Right as a Mechanism for Control 
In both SunTrust and Salinger the district courts granted 
preliminary injunctive relief.87 In both cases, the courts’ decisions 
focused not on infringement, which was summarily decided,88 but 
rather on fair use.89 Both district courts held that the secondary uses 
were not parodies and were not transformative enough to constitute a 
fair use.90 The language the district courts used in coming to these 
 
in which ideas are expressed, but not the ideas.”). When the defendant 
in SunTrust raised the idea/expression dichotomy in asserting a lack of 
substantial similarity between The Wind Done Gone and protectable 
elements of Gone with the Wind, the Court soundly rejected the 
defendant’s argument, finding actionable substantial similarity. 
SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1368. In Salinger, the only mention of 
the idea/expression dichotomy is in reference to its role in preventing a 
conflict with the First Amendment. Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 255. 
86. See SunTrust Answer and Affirmative Defenses, supra note 49, at 8 (“A 
restraining order or injunction impeding promotion and/or publication 
of The Wind Done Gone would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.”); 
Salinger Amended Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 49, at 13 
(“Any grant of the relief requested by Salinger would infringe on 
Defendants’ rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States of America . . . .”). 
87. See SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1386 (“[D]efendant is hereby 
PRELIMINARILY ENJOINED from further production, display, 
distribution, advertising, sale, or offer for sale of the book The Wind 
Done Gone.”); Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. at 269 (“[T]he Court 
preliminarily enjoins Defendants from manufacturing, publishing, 
distributing, shipping, advertising, promoting, selling, or otherwise 
disseminating any copy of 60 Years . . . .”). 
88. See SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1370 (“[T]he court finds as a matter 
of fact that the substantial similarities between the two works involve 
actionable copyrightable elements . . . .”); Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 
254 (“Plaintiff has shown that there is substantial similarity between 
Catcher and 60 Years . . . such that it was an unauthorized 
infringement of Plaintiff’s copyright.”). 
89. SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1370–84; Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 
254–68. 
90. SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1381; Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 260–
61. 
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conclusions demonstrates that the interest at issue here is seen as 
something other than, or perhaps more than, utilitarian. 
In SunTrust, the court’s statements during the temporary 
restraining order/preliminary injunction hearing are illuminating. 
Judge Pannell, in response to defense counsel’s argument that 
issuance of a preliminary injunction would constitute an impermissible 
prior restraint under the First Amendment, said: 
Well, if you carried that—I don’t have any idea how many 
copyright cases I handled on the Superior Court, but I handled 
a lot of trespass cases. And I’ve had cases where a fellow would 
just take a bulldozer and start across another man’s land 
because that was the easiest way to get there and it would save 
him a lot of money. And then when we got to court, the 
bulldozer guy would whine that if we enjoined him from going 
across the man’s pasture, it was going to cost him a lot of 
money. 
Well, we didn’t give him much truck on that argument because 
it wasn’t his land to begin with, number one. Number two, he 
was obviously a trespasser. Number three, he can just find 
another way, and that is his tough luck. . . . 
So, if your client has trespassed on their copyright, I don’t see 
the balance of the harm to your client really coming into play, 
because you are a trespasser.91 
This conflation of copyright with real property is problematic because 
the consequence of treating copyright as if it is interchangeable with 
tangible, real property is overprotection.92 Said another way, treating 
copyright infringement as akin to trespass upon real property 
disregards the constitutional and historical framework in which 
statutory copyright has developed and imposes the theoretical 
framework surrounding real property in its place.93 This conflation 
ignores the speech interests at issue in copyright cases and the 
inherent differences between real property and copyrighted works.94 
 
91. Temporary Restraining Order Transcript, supra note 73, at 68. 
92. See William Patry, Moral Panics and The Copyright Wars 
109–20 (2009) (explaining that the main difference between tangible 
property and copyrights arises from ex ante physical limitations on 
rights in the former and expansive, abstract ex post rights in the latter).  
93. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 
Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1031 (2005) (“[F]ree competition is the norm. 
Intellectual property rights are an exception to that norm, and they are 
granted only when—and only to the extent that—they are necessary to 
encourage invention.”). 
94. See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. Birch, Jr., A Unified 
Theory of Copyright (Craig Joyce ed., 2009), printed in 46 Hous. L. 
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As a practical matter, it gives the court a shortcut from infringement 
to injunctive relief that is contrary to the statutory language and to 
Supreme Court precedent.95  
The trespasser quotation taken from the transcript for the 
temporary restraining order hearing foreshadows the court’s ultimate 
decision. In the decision, the court resolved the tension between 
copyright and the First Amendment as follows: “With respect to 
copyright protection, . . . the First Amendment does not license an 
infringing author to trample on legally recognized rights. . . . The 
competing public interests of access to Ms. Randall’s work and 
preserving a copyright holder’s ownership interests, on balance, favor 
preserving the plaintiff’s copyright interests.”96 That the limited 
statutory copyright prevailed over the Constitution’s guarantee of free 
expression seems to be of little moment. Examining the court’s 
understanding of the degree of control given to copyright owners by 
the Copyright Act may explain this apparent supremacy of the 
Copyright Act over the First Amendment. 
Although nothing in the language of § 106(2) of the Copyright 
Act supports an exclusive right to absolute control by the copyright 
owner, the district court in SunTrust seems to have agreed with the 
plaintiff’s assertion that the right includes not only the right to 
license or create derivative works but also the right to control 
derivative works. For example, the court stated that “the licensing, 
creation, and control over derivative uses is an important economic 
incentive to the creation of the original.”97 For this proposition the 
court cited Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, where the Supreme Court stated 
that “licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to 
 
Rev. 215, 239 (2009) (“The property right that is copyright, then, is 
necessarily a limited right, because copyright cannot constitutionally 
inhibit the public’s right to know and learn.”). 
95. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006) (concerning remedies for copyright 
infringement). The statutory language is permissive: “Any court having 
jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may . . . grant 
temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem 
reasonable . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court recognized 
the permissive nature of this grant. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (“[C]ourts may also wish to bear in mind 
that the goals of copyright law, to stimulate the creation and 
publication of edifying matter, are not always best served by 
automatically granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to 
have gone beyond the bounds of fair use.” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
96. SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. at 1385 (citing In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 
918 F.2d 140, 143–44 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
97.  Id. at 1383 (emphasis added). 
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the creation of originals.”98 In SunTrust, the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement is broadened to include factual situations, such as the 
one here, where the plaintiff would never have licensed the 
defendant’s use. This broadening is manifest in the court’s inclusion of 
the word “control,” which appears nowhere in the Supreme Court’s 
Campbell decision and, in fact, contravenes the Supreme Court’s 
ultimate decision in that case, which held that certain derivative uses 
cannot be controlled by copyright owners. Specifically, the Supreme 
Court stated:  
The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that 
creators of original works would in general develop or license 
others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators of 
imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of 
their own productions removes such uses from the very notion 
of a potential licensing market.99 
Copyright owners have the exclusive right to prepare and license 
derivatives.100 This right does not extend to controlling uses a 
copyright owner would never prepare or license.  
The district court’s issuance of injunctive relief also disregarded 
Supreme Court precedent. The SunTrust court gave little credence to 
the defendant’s argument that monetary damages could compensate 
the plaintiff: “Allowing the defendant to prevail on this basis would, 
‘in effect, make any copyright holder an involuntary licensor of the 
copyright to any entity that could be relied on to pay damages.’ Such 
a policy would undoubtedly weaken the integrity of a copyrighted 
work.”101 This statement simply cannot be reconciled with the 
Campbell Court’s earlier assertion: 
Because the fair use enquiry often requires close questions of 
judgment as to the extent of permissible borrowing in cases 
involving parodies (or other critical works), courts may also 
 
98. Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593). The Campbell Court cited the 
statutory provision enumerating the derivative works right, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(2). See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593. It is undoubtedly circular 
reasoning to assert that the existence of a statutory provision evidences 
the fact that this right acts as an incentive. It is much more reasonable 
to say that Congress presumably anticipated that it will incentivize 
creators. Without some empirical evidence that it does, the existence of 
the statutory right is neither justification nor evidence that it provides 
an incentive. 
99. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added). 
100. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006). 
101. SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1384 (citation omitted) (quoting 
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 
338 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right 
531 
wish to bear in mind that the goals of the copyright law, “to 
stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,” are 
not always best served by automatically granting injunctive 
relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds 
of fair use.102 
The facts presented in the SunTrust case seem to be precisely the 
circumstances the Campbell Court foresaw. The SunTrust court did 
find that The Wind Done Gone “contain[ed] transformative parody 
that criticize[d]” Gone with the Wind,  but went on to hold that “it 
does so no more than any other sequel to an original work.”103 In 
other words, although the court recognized the parodic elements in 
The Wind Done Gone, it ultimately held that those elements were not 
sufficient to constitute fair use. This is precisely the set of circum-
stances the Campbell Court envisioned when it stated that the 
automatic grant of injunctive relief may sometimes be inappropriate. 
The SunTrust court’s divergence from Campbell shows that it viewed 
“the integrity of [the] copyrighted work” as primary and the 
defendant’s asserted defenses—fair use and the First Amendment—as 
secondary.104  
A similar dynamic is at play in the district court’s decision in 
Salinger v. Colting. In the “Introduction” to its opinion, the Southern 
District of New York summarily held that “Plaintiff has shown that 
there is substantial similarity between Catcher and 60 Years, as well 
as between the character Holden Caulfield from Catcher, and the 
character Mr. C from 60 Years, such that it was an unauthorized 
infringement of Plaintiff’s copyright.”105 This summary determination 
obscures the determination of which exclusive right in the copyright 
bundle was infringed. It is entirely unclear whether the court’s 
determination that there is substantial similarity between Catcher 
and 60 Years is a finding that the exclusive right to copy the novel 
was infringed or that, as the plaintiff alleged, the exclusive right to 
prepare derivative works was infringed.106 This is perhaps unsurprising 
because currently the consequences for infringing either right are 
 
102. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1105, 1134 (1990)). 
103. SunTrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1378. 
104  Id. at 1384. 
105. Salinger v. Colting (Salinger I ), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
106. Id. For a comprehensive discussion of the issues associated with 
determining infringement of the derivative works right by reference to 
the substantial similarity test, see generally Paul Goldstein, Derivative 
Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. Copyright Soc’y 
U.S.A. 209 (1983). 
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exactly the same. But when one considers the constitutional basis for 
copyright, it becomes clear that there should be some distinction 
between the consequences that flow from copying a protected work 
and those that accrue from creating a new work based on a protected 
work.107 Treating an author of a secondary work the same way one 
treats a copier denies the fact that the secondary work is itself a work 
of authorship and has the bizarre consequence of utilizing the 
Copyright Act to restrict the distribution of a work which would 
otherwise be protected by it.108 It is difficult to understand how such a 
result is justified in the context of the utilitarian objectives ascribed 
to copyright.109 
Having made this summary determination of infringement, the 
remainder of the court’s opinion considered whether Colting’s use can 
properly be categorized as a fair use.110 The vast majority of this 
consideration focused upon whether Colting’s use was sufficiently 
transformative.111 Ultimately, this question is shorthand for whether 
Colting’s use is one which ought to require the permission of the 
copyright owner. In the face of assertions on the record that Salinger 
would never license this derivative use or any other, the Southern 
District of New York held that 
although Salinger has not demonstrated any interest in publishing 
a sequel or other derivative work of Catcher, the Second Circuit 
has previously emphasized that it is the “potential market” for 
the copyrighted work and its derivatives that must be examined, 
even if the “author has disavowed any intention to publish them 
during his lifetime,” given that an author “has the right to 
 
107. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) 
(citing Leval, supra note 102, at 1132) (recognizing that cases 
presenting something other than simple piracy require distinct 
treatment). 
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (“The subject matter of copyright as 
specified by section 102 includes . . . derivative works, but protection for 
a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does 
not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used 
unlawfully.”).  
109. See infra Part III (discussing the motivating principles behind copyright 
protection). 
110. See Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 254–68 (analyzing plaintiff’s alleged 
fair use in terms of the purpose and character of the use, the nature of 
the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work). 
111. Id. at 256–63 (ultimately finding a lack of transformative elements in 60 
Years Later). 
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change his mind” and is entitled to protect his opportunity to sell 
his [derivative works].112  
The court then went on, just as the Northern District of Georgia had 
in SunTrust, to broaden the Supreme Court’s statement in Campbell 
that the licensing of derivatives acts as an important economic 
incentive to the creation of original works:  
[S]ome artists may be further incentivized to create original 
works due to the availability of the right not to produce any 
sequels. This might be the case if, for instance, an author’s 
artistic vision includes leaving certain portions or aspects of his 
character’s story to the varied imaginations of his readers, or if 
he hopes that his readers will engage in discussion and 
speculation as to what happened subsequently. Just as licensing 
of derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation 
of originals, so too will the right not to license derivatives 
sometimes act as an incentive to the creation of originals.113 
The court here merged the idea of economic incentives that copyright 
is recognized as intending to provide with the more general idea of 
incentivizing authors.114 There is no question that the incentive 
associated with the “right not to license” is not economic. Clearly, the 
refusal to license or create a derivative work means that this right in 
the copyright bundle is not being economically exploited. While 
incentivizing authors in ways that are not economic may well be a 
laudable goal, it is difficult to reconcile a right not to license with the 
accepted utilitarian objectives of copyright. 
In both SunTrust and Salinger, we see the district courts 
broadening the Supreme Court’s pronouncements from Campbell to 
encompass the factual situations presented. In SunTrust, this is done 
by recharacterizing the derivative works right to include not only 
creation and licensing but also control. In Salinger, it is accomplished 
by broadening the idea of economic incentive to encompass the right 
not to license or create derivatives, a right which plainly is motivated 
by something other than economics. In both cases, the district courts 
found in favor of the plaintiffs and issued preliminary injunctions. 
These cases diverge at the appellate court level and, at least initially, 
on the courts’ considerations of the First Amendment.  
 
112. Id. at 268 (quoting Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d 
Cir. 1987)(alteration in original)). 
113. Id. 
114. See infra Part III (discussing the motivating principle behind copyright 
protection). 
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D. The Decisions of the Appellate Courts: The Eleventh Circuit’s First 
Amendment Decision Dressed Up in Fair Use Clothes Versus the Second 
Circuit’s Focus on Irreparable Harm to the Exclusion of Considering 
Defendant’s First Amendment Arguments 
In both SunTrust v. Houghton Mifflin and Salinger v. Colting, the 
defendants appealed the issuance of the preliminary injunctions.115 
Both defendants asserted that the preliminary injunction constituted 
a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment, and both 
asserted that their uses were fair uses beyond the control of the 
copyright owner.116 Both defendants prevailed on appeal.117 Initially, 
the SunTrust defendant’s victory appeared to be a victory for the 
First Amendment.118 Ultimately, though, the SunTrust court recast its 
decision as one based upon fair use, finding that Randall’s novel was a 
parody of Gone with the Wind.119 In contrast, the Salinger defendant’s 
reliance upon the First Amendment was almost entirely ignored by 
the Second Circuit.120 Instead, the Second Circuit, relying on recent 
Supreme Court precedent, reversed and remanded for a determination 
of whether the plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed in the absence 
of preliminary injunctive relief.121 The Southern District of New York’s 
finding that 60 Years Later was not a fair use of Catcher would remain 
 
115. Notice of Appeal, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust I ), 
136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (No. 1:01-CV-701-CAP); Notice 
of Appeal, Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 1:09-cv-05095-DAB). 
116. Brief of Appellant Houghton Mifflin Co. at 18–35, 39, SunTrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust III ), 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(No. 01-122-00-HH) (“Considered in light of the First Amendment and 
the transformative uses made by [The Wind Done Gone] of [Gone with 
the Wind], the district court’s injunction is an unconstitutional prior 
restraint.”); Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 26, 37–57, Salinger v. 
Colting (Salinger II ), 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878-cv) 
(“Stopping the presses on this book, even for a short period of time, is a 
prior restraint that the First Amendment cannot tolerate.”).  
117. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust III ), 268 F.3d 1257 
(11th Cir. 2001); Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II ), 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
118. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust II ), 252 F.3d 1165 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
119. SunTrust III, 268 F.3d at 1272 (“We have already determined that [The 
Wind Done Gone] is a parody . . . .”). 
120. Salinger II, 607 F.3d at 76 (“[W]e need not decide whether the 
preliminary injunction issued by the District Court constituted an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.”). 
121. Salinger II, 607 F.3d at 84 (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
547 U.S. 388 (2006)). 
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intact.122 Examining this divergence aids in understanding the varying 
positions that persist with regard to the degree of control over 
derivative uses understood to reside in copyright owners. 
The day the SunTrust appeal was argued before the Eleventh 
Circuit, the court vacated the injunction issued by the Northern 
District of Georgia, stating, “It is manifest that the entry of a 
preliminary injunction in this copyright case was an abuse of 
discretion in that it represents an unlawful prior restraint in violation 
of the First Amendment.”123 But five months later the Eleventh 
Circuit vacated that per curiam opinion and replaced it with an 
opinion recasting its previously unequivocal free speech statement in 
the guise of an assessment of the fair use factors.124 That opinion cited 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s opinion in 
Eldred v. Reno for the proposition that “[i]n copyright law, the 
balance between the First Amendment and copyright is preserved, in 
part, by the idea/expression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair 
use.”125 Of course, the D.C. Circuit had gone much further, stating 
that “copyrights are categorically immune from challenges under the 
First Amendment.”126 It is little wonder, then, that the remainder of 
the Eleventh Circuit’s substitute opinion was clothed in the 
framework of fair use.  
Although this new opinion from the Eleventh Circuit privileged 
the fair use defense over the First Amendment, it is nonetheless clear 
that the First Amendment concerns expressed in the prior per curiam 
opinion remained present. The court said, “To approach these issues 
in the proper framework, we should initially review the history of the 
Constitution’s Copyright Clause and understand its relationship to 
the First Amendment.”127 In stark contrast, the Second Circuit, in 
Salinger v. Colting, avoided the prior restraint issue altogether: “We 
 
122. Id. at 83 (“More serious is Defendants’ assertion of a fair use defense. 
And at this preliminary stage, we agree with the District Court that 
Defendants will not likely be able to make out such a defense.”).  
123. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust II ), 252 F.3d 1165, 
1166 (11th Cir. 2001). 
124. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust III ), 268 F.3d 
1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
125. Id. at 1263 (citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); 
see Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375 (“The first amendment objection . . . was 
misplaced ‘[i]n view of the First Amendment protections already 
embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable 
expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for 
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use.’”) (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1984))). 
126. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375. 
127. SunTrust III, 268 F.3d at 1260. 
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agree that eBay abrogated parts of this Court’s preliminary injunction 
standard in copyright cases . . . . In light of that holding we need not 
decide whether the preliminary injunction issued by the District 
Court constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.”128 
The remainder of the Second Circuit opinion concerned itself pri-
marily with demonstrating that eBay, which reversed the Federal 
Circuit’s presumption of irreparable harm in the context of issuance of 
a permanent injunction in a patent infringement case, applied with 
equal force in the context of the issuance of a preliminary injunction 
in this copyright infringement case.129 In fact, the Second Circuit’s de 
novo consideration of the substance of Salinger’s copyright 
infringement claim begins and ends on the second-to-last page of the 
opinion. The court noted for reasons of judicial economy “that there is 
no reason to disturb the District Court’s conclusion as to the factor it 
did consider—namely, that Salinger is likely to succeed on the merits 
of his copyright infringement claim.”130 
While the defendant’s First Amendment assertions went largely 
unheeded in Salinger, the Second Circuit did consider the First 
Amendment interests of the plaintiffs in its analysis of whether the 
plaintiffs had demonstrated that, in the absence of injunctive relief, 
they would be irreparably harmed.131 As to the asserted First 
Amendment interests, the court said that “a defendant . . . has a core 
First Amendment interest in the freedom to express himself or herself, 
so long as that expression does not infringe the plaintiff’s 
copyright.”132 This, of course, harkens back to the supremacy of 
copyright over the First Amendment observed in the district court 
opinions in both Salinger and SunTrust. The court then turned its 
attention to the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs: “The 
plaintiff’s interest is, principally, a property interest in the 
copyrighted material. But . . . a copyright holder might also have a 
First Amendment interest in not speaking.”133 The most obvious  
128. Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II ), 607 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2010). 
129. Id. at 77–78 (“We hold today that eBay applies with equal force (a) to 
preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued for alleged copyright 
infringement. First, nothing in the text or the logic of eBay suggests 
that its rule is limited to patent cases. On the contrary, eBay strongly 
indicates that the traditional principles of equity it employed are the 
presumptive standard for injunctions in any context.” (citing eBay, Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006))). Further, the 
court noted that the eBay Court’s reliance on copyright decisions 
constituted further evidence that eBay should apply in the copyright 
context. Id. at 77. 
130. Id. at 83. 
131. Id. at 81. 
132. Id.  
133. Id. (citation omitted). 
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critique of the court’s assertion that the plaintiffs here have a right 
not to speak, protected by the First Amendment, is, of course, that 
the copyright holder is not being made to speak. It simply cannot be 
sustained that the publication of 60 Years Later would be 
tantamount to government compulsion to express a particular 
viewpoint.134 Rather, it is Colting, the author of 60 Years Later, who, 
as a result of the issued injunction, is being made not to speak. This 
critique is further developed by a review of the cited precedent. 
For the proposition that “a copyright holder might also have a 
First Amendment” right not to speak, the Second Circuit cited the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises.135 In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court considered 
whether The Nation’s use of relatively short excerpts from the 
memoirs of President Ford to scoop an article slated to be run by 
another magazine prior to the release of the memoirs constituted fair 
use.136 In coming to the conclusion that The Nation’s use was not a 
fair use, the Court stated that “freedom of thought and expression 
‘includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from 
speaking at all.’”137 The Court went on to say, “Courts and 
commentators have recognized that copyright, and the right of first 
publication in particular, serve this countervailing First Amendment 
value.”138 Even if this premise is accepted as true, the facts of Salinger 
simply do not comport with the Supreme Court’s holding in Harper & 
Row. Salinger had long since published Catcher, so any right of first 
publication was properly exercised. Moreover, it is difficult to 
comprehend how Colting’s novel can be perceived as a compulsion of 
speech from Salinger. The Second Circuit’s ultimate statement that 
“infringement of the right not to speak, ‘for even minimal periods of 
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury’” is plainly at odds 
with both the facts of the case and the precedent upon which it 
relies.139 The court firmly rooted its decision that Salinger has the 
right to choose not to license or create derivative works and has the 
 
134. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that a 
New Hampshire statute requiring the display of the state motto “Live 
Free or Die” infringed upon Petitioner’s right not to speak). The Court 
held “the right of freedom of thought protected by the First 
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely 
and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” Id. 
135. Salinger II, 607 F.3d at 81 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)). 
136. Harper, 471 U.S. 539. 
137. Id. at 559 (quoting Wooley, 430 U. S. at 714). 
138. Harper, 471 U.S. at 560. 
139. Salinger II, 607 F.3d at 81 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 
(1976)). 
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right, by extension, to control the publication of derivative works by 
others in the First Amendment’s protection of the right not to speak. 
And the court saw no need to revisit the specious argument that such 
a right, which is clearly lacking in an economic basis, is founded on 
copyright. The Eleventh Circuit, having found no similar First 
Amendment protection for the copyright owners of Gone with the 
Wind, went on to consider whether the Copyright Act itself 
establishes such a right.140 In his concurrence, Judge Marcus answered 
this query unequivocally in the negative.141 
Marcus’s concurrence is notable for its treatment of the SunTrust 
plaintiff’s admitted practice of exercising editorial control over 
licensed derivative works.142 Marcus viewed this exercise as an 
attempt to “preserve Gone With the Wind’s reputation, or protect its 
story from ‘taint’” and emphatically dismissed any role copyright law 
may play in such an endeavor, stating that SunTrust “may not now 
invoke copyright to further that goal.”143 He stated his opinion on this 
issue succinctly: “[I]t is not copyright’s job to ‘protect the reputation’ 
of a work or guard it from ‘taint’ in any sense except an economic 
one . . . .”144 Marcus took this a step further, generalizing to copyright 
owners as a class, stating that copyright “should not also afford them 
windfall damages for the publication of the sorts of works that they 
themselves would never publish, or worse, grant them a power of 
indirect censorship.”145 Marcus’s concurrence, like the Eleventh 
Circuit’s majority decision, holds that the plaintiff’s refusal to create 
or license certain derivatives simply cannot be maintained by 
reference to copyright’s utilitarian objectives.146 Marcus’s lack of 
ambiguity in this regard lends clarity to the fair use analysis that is so 
often lacking. 
 
140. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (SunTrust III ), 268 F.3d 1257, 
1276 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[SunTrust] has failed to show, at least at this 
early juncture in the case, how the publication of [The Wind Done 
Gone], a work that may have little to no appeal to the fans of [Gone 
with the Wind] who comprise the logical market for its authorized 
derivative works, will cause it irreparable injury. To the extent that 
Suntrust will suffer monetary harm from the infringement of its 
copyright, harms that may be remedied through the award of monetary 
damages are not considered ‘irreparable.’”). 
141. Id. at 1282–83 (Marcus, J., concurring). 
142. Id.  
143. Id. at 1282. 
144. Id. at 1280.  
145. Id. at 1283.  
146. For the majority’s in-depth discussion of the history of copyright in the 
United States and its evidence of utilitarian purposes, see id. at 1260–63. 
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II. A Brief History of Copyright 
in the United States: A Study in Accretion 
Salinger’s Catcher, written in 1951, will be protected by copyright 
until December 31, 2046.147 At the time of its writing, under the 
provisions of the Copyright Act of 1909, Catcher would have been 
eligible for an initial term of twenty-eight years and a potential 
renewal term of twenty-eight years—a maximum of fifty-six years of 
copyright protection.148 Assuming the renewal term was exercised, 
Catcher would have passed into the public domain in 2007, two years 
prior to the publication of Colting’s novel. Gone with the Wind will 
remain under copyright until December 31, 2031, although, at the 
time of its publication in 1936, it too would have been afforded a 
maximum of 56 years protection. It would have passed into the public 
domain in 1992, nearly ten years before the writing of Randall’s The 
Wind Done Gone.  
Since the publication of Gone with the Wind and Catcher, the 
copyright term has been extended twice.149 Under the 1976 Act, the 
copyright term in a work already in its renewal term as of the 
effective date of the Act was “extended to endure for a term of 
seventy-five years from the date copyright was originally secured.”150 
Under that formulation, Gone with the Wind would have passed into 
the public domain on January 1, 2012 and the copyright on Catcher 
would have ended on December 31, 2026. But Congress passed the 
Copyright Term Extension Act, which became effective October 27, 
1998, extending these dates by an additional twenty years.151  
  
 
147. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (2006) (“Any copyright still in its renewal term at 
the time that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act becomes 
effective shall have a copyright term of 95 years from the date copyright 
was originally secured.”). 
148. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–1081 
(1909) (repealed 1976), reprinted in Copyright Enactments: Laws 
Passed in the United States Since 1783, Copyright Office 
Bulletin No. 3, at 73–74 (1973).  
149. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304(b), 90 Stat. 2541, 
2574; Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 
§ 102(d)(1)(B), 112 Stat. 2827, 2828 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 304(b) (2006)). In addition to these extensions, nine interim extensions 
for works copyrighted between September 19, 1906, and December 31, 
1918 were passed between 1962 and 1974. See U.S. Copyright Office, 
Circular 92, Copyright Law of the United States 141 n.7 
(2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap3.html.  
150. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b).  
151. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102(d)(1)(B). 
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Before the writing of both Gone with the Wind and Catcher, 
Congress had already twice extended the copyright term. Under the 
1790 Act, an author was afforded a term of fourteen years with a 
potential renewal term of fourteen years.152 The renewal could be 
exercised only if the author was living at the end of the initial term.153 
A little over forty years later, Congress passed the Copyright Act of 
1831, extending the initial term to twenty-eight years with a potential 
renewal term of fourteen years that could be exercised by a living 
author, or a widow or child of a deceased author.154  
In addition to these term extensions, the scope of copyright 
protection has also gradually increased over time.155 Of particular 
interest for this Article is the adoption and steady expansion of the 
adaptation right. The Copyright Act of 1790 included no adaptation 
right; it granted authors only the “right and liberty of printing, 
reprinting, publishing and vending” their works.156 It was not until 
1870 that Congress adopted a very limited adaptation right with 
regard to books.157 In passing this legislation, Congress effectively 
overturned decisions like the one in Stowe v. Thomas where the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the German translation of 
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin did not constitute 
copyright infringement.158 The 1909 Act significantly broadened the 
adaptation right:  
 
152. Copyright Act of 1790 § 1, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, 
supra note 148, at 22. 
153. Id. 
154. Copyright Act of 1831 §§ 1–2, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, 
supra note 148, at 27.  
155. “Scope” in this context refers to when the author means to make 
reference to both the categories of works that constitute copyrightable 
subject matter and the rights inherent in the copyright bundle. The 
original Copyright Act protected only maps, charts, and books. 
Copyright Act of 1790 § 1, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, 
supra note 148. In contrast, the current Copyright Act protects “original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” and 
lists eight non-exclusive categories of copyrightable works: (1) literary 
works, (2) musical works, (3) dramatic works, (4) pantomimes and 
choreographic works, (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, (6) 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, (7) sound recordings, and 
(8) architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
156. Copyright Act of 1790 § 1, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, 
supra note 148, at 22. 
157. Copyright Act of 1870 § 86, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, 
supra note 148, at 37 (“authors may reserve the right to dramatize or to 
translate their own works.”). 
158. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514). 
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To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or 
dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary 
work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work; to convert it 
into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to 
arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, 
and finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art . . . .159 
The 1976 Act again considerably expanded the adaptation right, 
introducing the term “derivative work” into copyright’s statutory 
scheme for the first time.160 Under the 1976 Act, copyright holders 
have the exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work,”161 and the term “derivative work” is broadly 
defined as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as 
a translation, . . . dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture 
version, . . . abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”162 This steady growth 
of the adaptation right is the reason the SunTrust and Salinger 
plaintiffs can utilize the current derivative works right to argue that 
they are entitled to control all derivative uses during the copyright 
term. The current broad scope of the adaptation right is why the 
plaintiffs can refuse to deal and, as such, it begs the question of 
whether the current right is in line with the historical and 
constitutional purposes of copyright.163 
  
 
159. Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(b), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, 
supra note 149, at 64. 
160. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 106(2), 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 
(codified as 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006)); Pamela Samuelson, The Quest 
for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work Right, 101 Geo. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138479. 
161. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
162. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
163. See Rubenfeld, supra note 14, at 53–54 (arguing that the broad 
derivative works right conflicts with the First Amendment by 
suppressing acts of imagination). 
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III. In Search of a Motivating Principle:  
Why Do We Protect Copyright and How Does This 
Inform Our Understanding of the Appropriate 
Contours of the Derivative Works Right? 
Understanding why copyright is protected is necessary to 
understand the appropriate parameters of copyright protection. The 
reasons for protecting copyright are multifaceted and nuanced.164 In 
both the cases and the scholarship, such varied justifications as 
utilitarianism and personhood are proffered.165 The utilitarian 
argument posits that the protection of copyright serves the public 
good by incentivizing creators who enrich the public domain.166 
Personhood theory asserts that creative works are an expression of the 
author’s personality, and, therefore, the author’s interest in the work 
is more than pecuniary—it is dignitary.167 In Europe, personhood 
theory is often asserted as the theoretical basis for moral rights.168  
 
164. See generally Samuel E. Trosow, The Illusive Search for Justificatory 
Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital, 16 Can. J.L. & 
Jurisprudence 217 (2003) (discussing the traditional philosophical 
justifications underlying copyrights and their consistency with modern 
copyright expansion). 
165. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in New Essays in 
the Legal and Political Theory of Property 168 (Stephen R. 
Munzer ed., 2001). 
166. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The copyright law, 
like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration. . . . The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction 
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way 
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); L. Ray Patterson 
& Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ 
View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 
8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 Emory L.J. 909 (2003) 
(arguing that the Founders viewed the Copyright Clause as regulatory 
rather than proprietary and advancing the policies of promoting 
learning, providing public access, and protecting the public domain). 
167. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(reversing the district court’s denial of injunctive relief and finding that 
the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claims including a claim that 
defendant’s editing of their work constituted actionable mutilation of 
the work); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 
Stan. L. Rev. 957, 1014 n.202 (1982) (mentioning the development of 
the droit moral (moral right) claim aimed at giving artists the right to 
protect their works from alteration and destruction).  
168. Kwall, supra note 20, at 5 (“In other countries, the intrinsic dimension 
of the creative process is recognized independently of the external 
commodity through moral rights laws that protect the personal, as 
opposed to the economic, rights of authors.”). 
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In addition to utilitarianism and personhood theory, the theory 
that copyright serves to reward authors for their labor is still 
occasionally referenced by courts. Although the Supreme Court 
soundly rejected this theory in 1991 in Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Co.,169 the Court’s recent decision in Golan v. 
Holder, at least arguably, breathed new life into this theory. The 
Golan Court said that the Uruguay Round Agreements Act170 gave 
authors “nothing more than the benefit of their labors during 
whatever time remains before the normal copyright term expires.”171  
Finally, the idea that copyright is protected because it is property 
tends to make its way into decisions as well.172 But this fails to 
advance the discussion because it does not explain what property is or 
why we protect it. Property is itself a legal regime in search of a 
motivating principle.173 This question has been addressed by a long 
line of scholars who have come to diverse conclusions, including (1) 
property protects that which one takes control of by investing one’s 
labor into it174 and (2) personal property exists to maximize the 
wealth of society.175 Margaret Jane Radin is known for her personality 
theory of property, which seeks to justify property rights in the first 
instance and to delineate circumstances in which certain property 
interests should be privileged over others.176 In yet another attempt to 
justify the protection of personal property, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 
in an oft-cited passage, said: 
 
169. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The 
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 
‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). 
170. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 
4809, 4976 (1994) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 104A). 
171. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 893 (2012). 
172. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 94–95 (2d Cir. 
1987) (recognizing that owners of copyrights for unpublished materials 
nonetheless hold literary property rights). 
173. See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, On Private Property 89–104 
(2007) (discussing the various rationales and tensions underlying 
property as a concept). 
174. See, e.g., Richard Schlatter, Private Property (1951) (reviewing 
the theoretical history of property and suggesting that labor theory 
persists in both socialist and capitalist economies). 
175. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 347, 350 (1967) (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize 
externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the 
cost of internalization.”). 
176. See generally Radin, supra note 167.  
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It is in the nature of man’s mind. A thing which you have 
enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property 
or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away 
without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, 
however you came by it. The law can ask no better justification 
than the deepest instincts of man.177 
As noted above, each of these theories has a corollary in the 
intellectual property literature. While the utilitarian theory has 
predominated the discourse,178 this Article engages the idea that 
justifications for copyright are more nuanced179 and, moreover, that 
the touchstone for our copyright policy ought to always be the 
Constitution.180 
Getting back to the historical beginnings of copyright in this 
country requires that we acknowledge that the Copyright Act of 1976 
represents an exercise of Congress’s limited powers as vested by the 
Constitution.181 The Copyright Clause of the Constitution reads: “The 
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”182 Along with the Supreme Court in both Eldred v. 
Ashcroft and Golan v. Holder, a great many scholars have considered 
whether the current iteration of the Copyright Act is in keeping with 
the Constitution’s directive.183 The purpose of this Article is much less 
ambitious. It is to utilize this constitutional framework as I consider 
the problems presented by the derivative works right as demonstrated 
by the comparison of the Gone with the Wind case to the Catcher 
case. The difference in the outcomes of these two cases demonstrates 
that the degree of protection copyright affords tends to defy 
predictability. A better understanding of why we protect copyright 
will assist in determining how we ought to protect copyright.  
177. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 477 (1897). 
178. Kwall, supra note 20, at 23. 
179. See generally Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright 
Theory, 10 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 423 (1992) (calling for greater 
incorporation of moral right rationales into copyright law while 
preserving aspects of the utilitarian economic model). 
180. Patterson & Birch, supra note 94, at 258. 
181. See id. at 241–79 (detailing both the historical underpinnings of the 
Copyright Clause and the structure of the Copyright Act of 1976). 
182. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8.  
183. See, e.g., Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That—A Reluctant (and 
Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of 
Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 595 
(1996) (suggesting that a new constitutional framework is needed to 
combat copyright expansion by the courts and legislature).  
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While utilitarianism is often identified as the predominant theory 
underlying the American system of copyright, there is no question 
that the other theories are also deployed by parties and referenced by 
courts. There is a great deal of scholarship that longs for copyright’s 
return to its utilitarian beginnings.184 Utilitarianism, while important, 
is not and cannot be the sole justification for protecting an author’s 
interest in his or her creative works.185 Rather, as seen in the case 
comparison above, the way that the derivative works right is deployed 
by copyright owners and understood by many courts demonstrates 
the intuitive appeal of moral rights concepts.186 It follows that the 
appropriate way to vindicate such a right is through legislative 
protection rather than attempting to protect it within the guise of 
rights that make up part of the copyright bundle. Therefore, if we 
maintain that the copyright bundle represented by 17 U.S.C. § 106 
ought to be directed at the protection of a copyright owner’s 
economic rights and, therefore, justified by utilitarian concepts, the 
derivative works right in its current form is unjustifiable and should 
be repealed and replaced with a much more limited adaptation right. 
Further, if we accept that an author’s moral right of integrity ought 
to be protected, the statute should provide that protection 
transparently and in a more limited fashion. 
IV. How Do We Solve the Problem of the  
Derivative Works Right? 
A. What Is the Problem of the Derivative Works Right? 
Much has been written about the problems presented by the 
expansive definition of the term “derivative work” in the Copyright 
Act of 1976.187 Succinctly, the major contentions are that the 
derivative works right (1) places the Copyright Act in direct conflict 
with the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause of the 
 
184. See, e.g., Patterson & Birch, supra note 94, at 392 (“[T]he 
communications revolution . . . requires a return to fundamentals. . . . 
[C]opyright has only one purpose: to promote learning. But it has 
multiple functions to fulfill that purpose: to encourage the creation, 
dissemination, and use of learning materials.”).  
185. See Madhavi Sunder, IP 3, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 257, 263 (2006) 
(“[T]raditional law and economics analysis fails to capture fully the 
struggles at the heart of . . . intellectual property law conflicts.”); Yen, 
supra note 179 (noting the importance of combining the utilitarian 
economic model with other justifications for copyright). 
186. See supra Part I. 
187. See, e.g., Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 Brook. 
L. Rev. 1213, 1218–32 (1997) (noting problems of interpretation). 
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Constitution,188 (2) undercuts the idea/expression dichotomy,189 and 
(3) inserts uncertainty on the part of secondary users in light of the 
fact that the vast majority of derivative works cases are decided on 
the basis of the notoriously unpredictable fair use doctrine.190 The 
statutory definition of “derivative work” is so expansive that, 
arguably, it unhinges copyright from its constitutional and historical 
moorings.  
It has long been asserted that the statutory monopoly of 
copyright is held in check by two principles inherent in copyright law: 
the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.191 The 
idea/expression dichotomy is the principle that copyright does not 
protect the ideas embodied in copyrightable works but rather the 
expression in which those ideas are conveyed.192 The idea/expression  
188. See Christina Bohannon, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A Modest 
Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 
Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 669, 689 (2010) (“The derivative works 
right demands greater First Amendment scrutiny because it prohibits 
speaking as well as copying.”); John M. Newman, Note, Holden 
Caulfield Grows Up: Salinger v. Colting, the Promotion-of-Progress 
Requirement, and Market Failure in a Derivative-Works Regime, 96 
Iowa L. Rev. 737, 747 (2011) (noting the clash between copyright and 
the First Amendment). 
189. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Harry Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the 
Copyright Derivative Work, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 17, 23 (2006) (noting that 
courts sometimes mistakenly disregard this dichotomy). 
190. See Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won’t Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and 
Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 79, 88 (1991) 
(referring to the nebulous character of the fair use doctrine). 
191. See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment 
Guarantees of Free Speech and the Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, 
1203–04 (1970) (arguing that copyright is held in check by the 
idea/expression dichotomy and also positing that the limited duration of 
copyright is a factor in checking the copyright monopoly). It is 
important to note that at the time Nimmer was writing the copyright 
term was twenty-eight years with a potential renewal term of twenty-
eight years. Id. at 1194.  
192. The idea/expression dichotomy was first recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880), which noted that the 
“essence” of the work—and that part of it that copyright protects—lies 
in its “statement.” This doctrine, like many other copyright doctrines, 
comes to American jurisprudence from England. The late eighteenth-
century cases of Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 229; 4 
Burr. 2303, 2355 (Yates J., dissenting), and Donaldson v. Beckett, 
(1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 840; 2 Brown 129, 135, are noted as the 
basis of doctrine in English jurisprudence. Like the fair use doctrine, 
idea/expression was first codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2006). For a full explication of the history of the doctrine 
and how it functions in American jurisprudence, see Edward Samuels, 
The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 
321, 325 (1989).  
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dichotomy is codified in the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).193 
The fair use doctrine was originally a judge-made privilege allowing 
uses of copyrighted works in those instances in which allowing the use 
would further the purposes of copyright.194 The fair use doctrine was 
codified for the first time in the 1976 Act at 17 U.S.C. § 107.195 The 
expansive definition of the derivative works right provided in the 1976 
Act and, more specifically, the way that right is utilized by parties 
and understood by some courts, calls into question the longstanding 
notion that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine can 
properly contain the copyright monopoly.  
The argument advanced here is that the derivative works right, as 
it is currently deployed and understood, cannot be justified by the 
 
193. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied 
in such work.”). 
194. The doctrine of “fair abridgement” was recognized in England as early 
as 1761 in the case of Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 
(K.B.) 271. “Fair abridgement” was imported into American 
jurisprudence in the case of Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345, 348 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). The terminology “fair use” entered 
American jurisprudence in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1869) (No. 8136). See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 n.27 (1984) (describing the history of 
the fair use doctrine in American case law). 
195. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006):  
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the 
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means 
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement 
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in 
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include —  
(1)  the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; 
(2)  the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3)  the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4)  the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding 
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the 
above factors. 
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accepted utilitarian justifications for copyright law. To the extent 
that the interest intuitively protected by the derivative works right is 
deserving of protection, a separate justification and different 
parameters are required.  
The idea that the derivative works right is justified by utilitarian 
considerations has been advanced196 and refuted.197 Any claim that the 
derivative works right ought to be protected because it is property 
fails for all of the reasons that the argument to protect copyright 
because it is property fails.198 Specifically, the derivative works right is 
unlike any right we comprehend as a part of the bundle of rights 
associated with tangible property. As demonstrated above, the right 
to an injunction in the context of asserted infringement of the 
derivative works right has been analogized to the right of a landowner 
to exclude trespassers.199 This analogy is unavailing because, as 
compared to all five of the other rights encompassed in the copyright 
bundle, the right to exclude as applied to realty is a right to disallow 
another from having control over or access to some particular 
commodity. It is not, and has never been understood as, the right to 
disallow another from having access to or control over a different 
(though perhaps related) commodity. The preceding case comparison 
demonstrated that the copyright owners in the cases concerning Gone 
with the Wind and Catcher understood the derivative works right as 
something other than a pecuniary right—something akin to the moral 
right of integrity.  
B. What are Moral Rights? 
The phrase “moral rights” refers to a suite of rights intended to 
protect an author’s nonpecuniary interests in his or her creation.200 
 
196. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 353–57 (1989) (discussing the 
issue from the perspective of transaction costs, among related 
principles). 
197. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1197, 1217 (1996) (“Landes and Posner argue that giving 
derivative rights to the original owner reduces transaction costs by 
requiring a publisher who wants to bring out a new translation of a 
previously translated work to deal with only one copyright holder rather 
than two. On this point, they are simply wrong. If the copyright in the 
original did not extend to derivative works, the publisher of the 
translation would not have to obtain the original author’s consent.” 
(citing Landes & Posner, supra note 196)). 
198. See supra Part III. 
199. See supra note 92. 
200. See Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Right, A Primer, 7 
B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 41, 44 (1998) (describing moral rights and arguing 
that theyprotect the integrity of the “creative process”). 
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These rights include, but are not necessarily limited to, the rights of 
attribution, disclosure, withdrawal, and integrity.201 The right of 
attribution is defined as the right to have one’s work identified as 
such.202 The right of disclosure is the right of an “author to determine 
publication or nonpublication of his or her work.”203 The limited right 
of withdrawal is the right, recognized only rarely outside of France, to 
retract a previously published work.204 Finally, the right of integrity is 
defined as “the right of authors to preserve their work from alteration, 
mutilation, or even, in some circumstances, excessive criticism.”205 
One commentator stated that the right of integrity “recognizes the 
work as an extension of the author’s personality.”206 This right is said 
to safeguard the author’s creative vision by guaranteeing the integrity 
of his or her text.207 This interest is demonstrably personal in nature, 
and as a result, where the right is recognized, it is generally seen as 
inalienable.208  
V. A Proposed Solution: Understanding the 
Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right 
If one accepts the proposition that an author ought to have the 
right to protect the integrity of his or her work, as the copyright 
owners in both Salinger and SunTrust asserted and as the trial courts 
and the Second Circuit confirmed, there is no question that the 
Copyright Act of 1976, while it may be contorted to address such a 
claim, was not intended to do so.209 The existing, expansive, 
exclusive derivative works provision is unjustifiable as a utilitarian 
mechanism.210 The problems it presents for the freedom of expression  
201. Id. at 46. 
202. Settlemyer, supra note 71, at 2304. 
203. Richard Fine, American Authorship and the Ghost of Moral Rights, 13 
Book Hist. 218, 222 (2010). 
204. Jeffrey M. Dine, Note, Authors’ Moral Rights in Non-European Nations: 
International Agreements, Economics, Mannu Bhandari, And The Dead 
Sea Scrolls, 16 Mich. J. Int’l L. 545, 551 (1995) (“The right of 
withdrawal is the least exercised moral right. Its formal existence is rare 
outside France and countries that derive their law from France.”). 
205. Fine, supra note 203, at 223. 
206. Heide, supra note 22, at 214.  
207. Lior Zemer, Essay, Moral Rights: Limited Edition, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 
1519, 1524 (2011). 
208. Id. (“Due to the special connection between the author’s personality and 
the work, civil law systems have traditionally regarded moral rights as 
inalienable . . . .”). 
209. Kwall, supra note 20, at 25–27. 
210. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right 
550 
of secondary users cannot be justified by whatever minimal economic 
incentive it provides to copyright holders. Repealing it and replacing 
it with a more limited adaptation right subject to a compulsory 
license would protect the pecuniary interests in adaptation. That 
more limited right might mirror the exclusive adaptation right 
delineated in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works: “Authors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the 
exclusive right of authorizing adaptations, arrangements and other 
alterations of their works.”211 
A new § 106B aimed at protecting an author’s integrity right 
would plainly state its intent and justification as the protection of an 
author’s work from distortion, mutilation, or other modification which 
is prejudicial to his or her reputation.  
It is important to note that nothing in this proposal is intended to 
deny copyright protection for derivative works. Derivative works 
would continue to be protected to the same extent as provided for 
under current law.212 Copyright owners will still be able to create 
derivatives, copyright those derivatives, and profit from them. All this 
proposal aims to do is limit the exclusive right to create and license 
derivative works, as broadly defined by the 1976 Act. The practical 
effect of this change is that secondary users seeking to create 
derivative works will not need the permission of the copyright owner 
and will not be liable to the copyright owner who refuses to deal. In 
fact, it will be possible for any party to create a derivative work upon 
payment of the license fee so long as the limited right of integrity 
represented by the new § 106B is not infringed. 
 
211. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 
12, July 24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, Hein’s No. KAV 2245. Note 
that Article 8 also provides for an exclusive right of translation. Id. art. 
8.  
212. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006): 
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 
includes compilations and derivative works, but protection 
for a work employing preexisting material in which 
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work 
in which such material has been used unlawfully. 
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends 
only to the material contributed by the author of such 
work, as distinguished from the preexisting material 
employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive 
right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such 
work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the 
scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright 
protection in the preexisting material. 
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A. The Contours of the New Section 106B 
Consider the fact that under current law, works created after 
January 1, 1978 will be protected by copyright, including the 
expansive derivative works right, for the life of the author plus 
seventy years.213 Under this formulation, the copyright in Catcher 
would last until the end of 2080—nearly 130 years. Margaret Mitchell 
died thirteen years after the publication of Gone with the Wind. 
Consider the absurdity of the fact that the derivative works right has 
subsisted in her estate for more than sixty years and will continue to 
subsist in her estate for another twenty years. Likewise, for the next 
thirty-five years, the derivative works right associated with Catcher 
will be owned exclusively by Salinger’s heirs or the beneficiaries 
named in his will. It is unfathomable that ownership of such a right 
by the author’s next of kin or successors in interest encourages 
innovation more than allowing the right to pass into the public 
domain would. The new moral right proposed here would last for the 
lifetime of the author, would not be transferable but would be 
waivable, would not apply to works made for hire, and would be 
subject to the fair use doctrine. 
The contours of the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) are 
instructive.214 In 1990, Congress passed VARA to afford visual artists 
certain “rights of attribution and integrity.”215 For works created after 
the effective date of VARA, the rights of attribution and integrity 
created by VARA “endure for a term consisting of the life of the 
author.”216 VARA is the sole explicit recognition of moral rights in the 
federal statutory scheme.  
The limitation to the lifetime of the author is appropriate for the 
same reason that the right created ought not to be transferable. That 
is, as noted by Professor Kwall in her recent work The Soul of 
Creativity, “[a]n author’s external work embodies her personal 
meaning and intended message and thus is reflective of her individual, 
intrinsic, creative process. No one, not even her spouse and children, 
can substitute a personal judgment regarding the substance of the 
author’s meaning and message.”217 This is the basis for Kwall’s 
assertion that “moral rights protection should expire upon the death 
of the author.”218 Moreover, limitation to the lifetime of the author 
makes sense because once the author is deceased protection of his or 
 
213. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). 
214. Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). 
215. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).  
216. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1). 
217. Kwall, supra note 20, at 160. 
218. Id. 
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her reputation is a nonissue. Finally, works made for hire should be 
ineligible for protection under the new § 106B because the right 
sought to be vindicated here, that is, the author’s right to maintain 
the integrity of his or her work from distortion that would harm the 
author’s reputation, is inherently personal. It would be anathema to 
confer such a right on a corporate entity.  
B. Considering the Implications of the New Section 106B: 
Hypothetical Resolutions of SunTrust and Salinger 
Under the proposal made here, both SunTrust and Salinger would 
have been resolved much more expeditiously. As an initial matter, the 
plaintiff in SunTrust would not have had standing to bring its suit 
because the right it would have had to rely upon would have expired 
upon Mitchell’s death. Even if suit were brought, no claim would lie 
under the Copyright Act, and the copyright owner would be left to 
resort to claims of trademark infringement.219 Likewise, in Salinger, 
the author would have had a claim that likely would have settled 
early in recognition of the right imbued by § 106B, or it would have 
expired upon Salinger’s death.220 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Golan v. Holder all but 
forecloses First Amendment arguments in the context of copyright. 
This leaves alleged infringers to resort to arguments based upon fair 
use. The case comparison undertaken here illustrates the 
unpredictability inherent in proceeding under the fair use banner. The 
cases concerning Gone with the Wind and Catcher are factually 
similar and yet come to very different ends. This Article suggests that 
one reason for this disparity is that the interest often sought to be 
vindicated by copyright owners under the guise of the derivative 
works right is personal rather than pecuniary. With that in mind, the 
Article proposes that Congress repeal the existing § 106(2) and 
replace it with a limited adaptation right subject to a compulsory 
license and a moral right of integrity. This would introduce 
transparency, disallow successors in interest from refusing to deal, and 
 
219. SunTrust Complaint, supra note 42, at 15–17. 
220. J.D. Salinger died while the Appeal to the Second Circuit was pending. 
See Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II ), 607 F.3d 68, 70 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“We note that Plaintiff-Appellee J.D. Salinger died during the 
pendency of this appeal. In a February 18, 2010 order, we granted the 
motion of Colleen M. Salinger and Matthew R. Salinger, trustees of the 
J.D. Salinger Literary Trust, to be substituted for Salinger as Appellees. 
For reasons of convenience, however, we will continue to refer to 
Salinger as ‘Plaintiff’ or ‘Appellee’ in this opinion.”). 
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have the added benefit of reining copyright in by reference to its 
constitutional and historical background. 
  
 
   
